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I. Introduction
One way to view the constitutional revision process, set in motion in the wake of the 2009 'Pots and Pans Revolution', triggered by the financial crisis in Iceland, is to see it as an experiment in democracy, 'digital democracy' in particular. From a broader perspective, the Icelandic process, which has drawn considerable academic attention, 1 is not the first example of popular involvement in constitution-making, but it is probably the most deliberate, the most democratic, and the most 'global' one to date. The drafting process was special both in terms of the extent of public participation and the way it was facilitated by digital means. We do not yet know how the story will end. The bill was approved by 67 per cent of the voters in a national referendum called by parliament in 2012, but the same parliament failed to ratify it before adjourning in 2013, leaving the bill in suspension where it remains at the time of writing (June 2016) .
This chapter has a twofold aim: introducing the Icelandic constitution-writing efforts generally and reporting on the extensive use of digital tools more specifically. The latter has been hailed as 'the most celebrated aspect of the Icelandic constitutional drafting process among advocates of "open government" worldwide' 2 . In constitution-drafting processes we can distinguish several phases, each of which can involve public participation by digital means: the 'constitutional moment' that was the trigger for revising the constitution; the election of the constituent assembly; the drafting of the constitutional text; and its adoption. 3 In the Icelandic case, the public participated in both the election of a Constitutional Council, tasked with drafting a new constitution, and -with the assistance of various digital tools -the drafting process itself. This chapter emphasizes the latter stage because this is where the link with the theme of the volume, e-Democracy, is strongest. 4 Since it is important for a rich understanding of the use of digital tools, including their limitations, to have some context, 5 this chapter will offer a brief description of the process in 1 M Tushnet, 'New Institutional Mechanisms for Making Constitutional Law ' (2015) , <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2589178> accessed 24 January 2016. 4 For more details on the participatory elements in the election and the referendum that was held after the Constitutional Council delivered its bill to parliament, see and . its entirety (Section II). Section III presents an inventory of digital aspects of the Icelandic experiment, discussing the role of digitalization in four important features of the case: the uniquely shaped drafting process, the fact that participation was not limited to Icelandic citizens, the content of the constitutional bill, and the treatment of the bill by parliament. Our analysis will be guided by insights from the specialized literature on 'popular constitutionmaking' dealing with a range of possible effects of public participation in constitutionmaking. 6 Section IV concludes.
II.
An overview of the constitution-making process The literature often distinguishes 'content effects' -understood as the impacts of participation on the final constitutional texts -and 'attitude effects' -which refer to a potentially higher degree of acceptance of a constitution that came into being with the help of the public. As this chapter focuses on the digital tools used, these categories do not appear as such. Z Elkins, T Ginsburg, and J Melton, 'A Review of Iceland's Draft Constitution', (2012) On June 16, 2010 the parliament (Althing) passed the Act on a Constitutional Assembly that should convene between February 15 and April 15, 2011. 10 Thus, the original plan was to allocate to the work half the time that it took to draft the US Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787. The process also included the preparation of the drafting by a Constitutional Committee, consisting of seven professionals, lawyers as well as academics from other disciplines, appointed by parliament. The role of the committee was to organize a National Assembly (also known as National Forum) and prepare written background material for the Constitutional Assembly. A National Assembly comprising 950 individuals drawn at random from the National Register convened for a day in late 2010. It concluded that a new constitution was needed and that it should include certain key provisions on, e.g., equal voting rights and public ownership of natural resources. Soon after, a national Single Transferable Vote election of 25 Constitutional Assembly representatives from a roster of 522 candidates was held. 11 Simultaneously, the Constitutional Committee produced a 700-page report The wider context of dissatisfaction with the institutions and the political culture is important for a full understanding of the role that popular participation came to play. For one thing, on September 28, 2010 parliament resolved unanimously that "criticism of Iceland's political culture must be taken seriously and [parliament] stresses the need for lessons to be learned from it. Parliament resolves that the report of the Special Investigation Commission of the parliament constitutes a condemnation of the government, politicians, and public administration" 12 . For an accurate, contextual understanding of this resolution several noteworthy features of Iceland´s parliamentary democracy need to be taken into account.
First, the constitutional system acquired a semi-presidential flavour when the Icelandic governor, during a political impasse in the 1940s, secured support for having the president of the Republic elected directly by the people in an otherwise parliamentary system. 13 Second, partly as a result of the significant and only gradually declining overrepresentation of rural areas in parliament, Iceland´s parliamentary system has been permeated by patronage, 14 a phenomenon also well known in other countries including the United States. 15 Footprints of this can be seen in the scattering of large infrastructural projects across the island. Third, corporatism is pervasive in Iceland. It is common for special interest groups -boat owners, bankers, farmers -to assist in the drafting of legislation and for employers and labour unions to dictate policy measures to the government. 16 It was not until the post-crash government came to office in 2009 that several key documents on the bank privatization process were disclosed by the prime minister´s office to the public. Even so, the parliament waited until late 2012 to resolve to launch an investigation of the privatization, but failed to implement its resolution.
former prime minister. 18 The country's anger at its political class after the crash also found an outlet through judicial means when the former prime minister Geir Haarde from the Independence Party was indicted by parliament in September 2010. 19 He was subsequently cleared of all but one charge, namely that -in violation of the constitution -he failed to keep his ministers sufficiently informed during the 2008 financial crisis. 20 An ad hoc parliamentary committee had determined that four former ministers should be indicted, but parliament, including current and former ministers who did not recuse themselves from the proceedings, decided to exonerate all except the former prime minister. This led the Independence Party to practically declare war on the government, thus extinguishing the hope that government and opposition could unite in honouring their promise to the people of a new constitution.
The position of the president in the 1944 Constitution had long been taken for granted.
The Constitution states that the president has a constitutional right to refer legislation to a national referendum. This provision was used for the first time in 2004 when the president refused to sign a bill on media ownership, citing not his conscience but rather a chasm between parliament and public opinion. 21 The 1944 Constitution stipulates that the statute in question still enters into force but must be put to a referendum within two months. Without explicit constitutional authority to do so, the government chose to withdraw the bill. Iceland´s semi-presidential parliamentary system was thus seen to function as intended, to the great displeasure of MPs across the spectrum. Several of them had argued, with the support of some law professors, that the fact that the constitutional authority of the president to veto legislation had lain dormant for 60 years, had somehow invalidated this provision. 22 This state of affairs made it clear to many Icelanders that a new constitution was needed to clarify the situation, either by reaffirming or perhaps modifying the semi-presidential setup of the 1944 Constitution or by making an explicit move either to a presidential system or to a
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In one case an applicant more qualified for the job than the prime minister's son was awarded damages. T Gylfason, 'Crowds and Constitutions', (13 October 2011) parliamentary one with only a ceremonial role for the president. In fact, members of one of several (ineffective) constitutional committees appointed by parliament over the years, launched in 2005, aimed to remove the president´s authority to veto legislation from the Constitution but failed. In the Constitutional Council, there was little support for giving more power or less power to the president; indeed, the National Assembly provided no instructions either way in this regard. The support for a stronger presidency was weakened by the incumbent president's perceived closeness to the bankers held, along with politicians, responsible for the 2008 crash. 23 On the other hand, the support for a less consequential presidency was weakened by the need to create a better balance between the three branches of government to limit executive overreach. 24 Even so, the Council bill aims to clarify the role of the president. 26 Two further significant amendments can be said to have been made: the first was made in 1984, when voting rights were equalized slightly once again. This amendment was enough to eliminate the last vestiges of the long-meant to demarcate rights and obligations. Those asked to give up their privileges (e.g., Iceland´s vessel owners) and to shoulder obligations (e.g., to stop polluting the environment) will oppose a constitution aiming to accomplish this. 27 But even some of those advocating the idea that constitutional change requires consensus realized that the shock of the crisis might override this way of thinking. 28 Rather than repeat the election, which would have created all sorts of problems, parliament decided to appoint the 25 elected representatives to a Constitutional Council which earlier legislation had referred to as a Constitutional Assembly. Undeterred by these events, in a role that was formally of an advisory nature, but with a strong mandate and high expectations on the part of the public, the Constitutional Council started its work on April 6, 2011. It had the 700-page background report by the Constitutional Committee, the conclusions of the National Assembly, and preparatory work by individual representatives to draw on. The Council convened for close to four months, from April 6 until July 28, 2011, unanimously -i.e., with 25 votes against zero -approving the constitutional bill on July 27, presenting a polished version to the speaker of parliament two days later. No other MPs attended the ceremony, a harbinger of things to come.
How was it possible to produce and unanimously pass a constitutional bill combining continuity with fairly radical reform in several areas -including equal voting rights, national standing bias in favour of the Progressive Party, though not the bias in favour of rural areas, which remains strong. The second significant amendment was made in 1995 when a few human rights provisions were added to the 1944 constitution.
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This is why the Federalists were so firmly opposed by the Anti-Federalists in the United States in 1787-1788, why the US constitution was supported by only 39 of the 55 delegates in Philadelphia and why it was approved by such low margins in several of the state referenda thereafter. ownership of natural resources, freedom of information, ambitious environmental protection, and more? We propose three main reasons. First, with only one exception, 29 concerning the number of MPs, the bill was consistent with the conclusions of the National Assembly in November 2010. 30 Second, public opinion polls reflected a broad consensus on key constitutional issues; in particular, there was no significant difference between the views expressed by the general public, the 522 Constitutional Council candidates, and the 25 elected representatives. Third, the method used to elect the Council members -one person, one vote combined with STV -produced a group of uniformly competent people from different walks of life with a wide range of professional experience, including eight academics used to soliciting outside expertise. In the first few days of the Council´s deliberations, it was decided to draft a new constitution from scratch, as was done in Philadelphia in 1787, rather than amend the 1944 Constitution. This was done with due respect for constitutional continuity as Elkins et al. emphasize in their review of the bill. 31 Also, it was decided to invite outsiders to participate through a specially designed interactive website as well as through social media.
A successful computer gaming company in Iceland introduced the Council and its staff to interactive methods which the Council decided to apply by approaching the drafting process in weekly episodes. The Council website was designed around this process. Every Friday a new version of the bill was published online enabling interested parties to compare it with older versions and to comment on the updates. In total, there were 11 revisions made to the document with more than 3,600 discussion threads posted. This was a way to underscore the popular nature of the constitution-making exercise as opposed to constitution-making by politicians and their lawyers. The open invitation to the public had an important additional benefit: it made it unnecessary -indeed, inappropriate -to invite representatives of interest groups to meet with the Council or with individual Council members as happened, for example, when the South African Constitution was put together during 1994-1996. This invitation was in line with the opening salvo of the preamble: "We, the people of Iceland, wish to create a just society with equal opportunities for everyone." The National Assembly called for a reduction in the number of seats in parliament. The bill stipulates an unchanged number of seats so as not to compromise the impression that the bill aims to strengthen the position of parliament and the courts against the executive branch. Council members present -four of the 25 could not attend -gave unanimous answers to the parliament´s queries, in some cases suggesting alternative formulations without changing the substance of the provisions in question. Not long thereafter, parliament decided to put the bill to a referendum. By now, the opposition in parliament -the Independence Party and also the Progressives who had reversed course -were fighting tooth and nail against the reform process, managing to delay the referendum beyond the presidential election of June 30, 2012, a date preferred by the government on the grounds that voter turnout is always high in presidential elections. Instead, the referendum was held on October 20, 2012. The bill as a whole as well as its key provisions put on the ballot by parliament won overwhelming support across the board with only two exceptions: the provision on equal voting rights was not accepted in two of the three rural constituencies and the provision on church and state was not approved. The overall support for the bill was 67 per cent, the support for equal voting rights was also 67 per cent, and for national ownership of natural resources 83 per cent. The turnout was 49 per cent, a remarkably high figure in view of the fact that the referendum was a political orphan. Even the government coalition parties that called the referendum did almost nothing to promote the bill or to encourage their supporters to vote. It fell on the smallest party in parliament, an opposition party with 3 seats out of 63, as well as on ordinary citizens, including some former Constitutional Council members, to travel around the country to discuss the bill with the voters.
The opponents of the bill resorted to peculiar arguments. They claimed not to have had enough time to study the bill while simultaneously staging the most extensive filibuster in the parliament´s history. They claimed that those who did not show up to vote did so because they were against the bill. They also stated that a 49 per cent turnout was not enough even if Icelandic law has no provision on minimum voter turnout. Finally, they argued that the first question on the ballot -that they had helped phrase -'Do you want the proposals of the Constitutional Council to form the basis of a legislative bill for a new Constitution?,' allowed them to build anything of their liking on this 'basis'. To the proponents of the bill a reasonable interpretation of the referendum result is that the 'yes' vote allowed parliament to make, if any, only editorial or technical changes. This was, indeed, the understanding of the the substance of the bill, several digital features of the drafting process are worth close study as there are important lessons to be learnt, especially when the use of digital tools is linked to the wider context of the Icelandic experiment. This section starts out by listing the uses of digital tools and proceeds to describe how these were interlinked with the drafting process and, where applicable, the substance of the proposed provisions.
A. Digital tools in the drafting process
Inclusiveness and digital democracy have an ambivalent relationship, even in Iceland, despite its record-high per capita number of internet users. There are always some 'unconnected citizens' who are excluded altogether if the process relies too heavily on internet-based digital tools. This is even more important because vulnerable citizens are likely to be overrepresented in this group. Constitution Council members decided to allow their phone numbers to be published, or rather not to have them removed from the telephone catalogue which would have been impractical anyway in view of the time frame, and to answer letters and phone calls as well. 35 The Constitutional Council was free to make such decisions as it was authorised by law to establish its own procedures and governance. It was the Council's intention from the start that the drafting process would be as open as possible to members of the public.
The first category of tools comprised the extensive social media applications actively used by the Council. When considering these, we need to keep in mind that the drafting took place during mid-2011 when social media use was a bit different from what it is today. Active presence in social media was not quite yet the 'obligatory feature' for actors in the public sphere that it became just a few years later. Social media were already widely used by political institutions in our part of the world, 36 but often mainly as window-dressing or for information dispersion purposes at best. At the time, the use of these fora to actively solicit input from the public was an innovative feature. The Council employed two computer experts to facilitate all technical aspects of the work, including social media use.
An important social media tool was the Council's Facebook page where Council members and staff made a point of trying to respond to most queries, comments, and suggestions.
Several suggestions from the public appeared to focus on a radically different economic model for the country whereas others concerned issues such as web neutrality, transparency, The end result in quantitative terms was a total number of 3,600 comments received in addition to some 320 formal suggestions from citizens, which were all discussed and answered by the three committees of the Council. 44
B. Interaction with the drafting process
The Constitutional Council actively and explicitly turned the 'golden triangle' of transparency, equal access, and technology into a leitmotiv of its working method. It was Lansberg-Rodriguez, 'Wiki-constitutionalism. The strange phenomenon that's destroying Latin America', The New Republican, May 25 2010. Claes observes that the term wiki-constitutionalism is confusing here since it implies broad participation through an open-source infrastructure, which is in fact not a feature of the processes 'wiki-constitutionalism' is referring to.
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Personal observation by one of the authors who was a member of the Constitutional Council. considered important not to follow 'standard operating procedure in parliamentary work' and 'not invite representatives of interest organisations to special meetings'. 45 This decision reflected the conviction that any semblance of playing political games was incompatible with the Council´s mandate. 46 In particular, the Council was adamant that MPs would not be granted special status in the drafting process. Instead, the Council held general meetings to which the public, within reasonable non-binding limits of space, was invited. No MP tried to interfere with the work of the Council as far as is known, nor did representatives of interest groups seek to make their views known, perhaps because they were not used to being invited to a seat at the same table as everyone else.
Digital applications played a role that was broader than soliciting input. They were also used to stay in contact with the public when it did not necessarily have a contribution to make, but was concerned about the state of play during the inevitably more closed phases of the Council's tenure. Staffers reassured people that up until the final decision on the draft, the Council would be reachable. In other words: in Iceland, participation in constitution-making was not only about 'what was said, but also [about] the things left unsaid' 47 . Concretely, provided that the information presented was full and up to date, the fact that no objections were being uttered proved valuable input for the drafters, too.
Two related benefits of popular participation also merit mentioning. One benefit was the feeling of ownership encouraged by the open invitation to the public which helped create the sentiment that this was indeed a constitutional bill for the people and drafted by the people.
This collective sentiment may go a long way towards explaining the strong support for the bill in the 2012 referendum. The other benefit was the clear message that special interest groups were not being offered special treatment, a message that strengthened the feeling of popular ownership.
The Council tried to continuously update the information on its website and social media sites. Proposals for constitutional provisions were posted in batches on the Council website, even quite provisional drafts, usually with intervals of two or three weeks, to make the input from the public as relevant as possible.
Admittedly, the manner of taking external input into account was rather haphazard, which is hardly surprising given the lack of a clear methodology for processing digital consultation input. 48 Social media routines and e-consultation software applications
were not yet what they are today. The Council engaged in trial and error. Its members generally thought it more important to debate substantive points amongst themselves and with external observers than to keep records of everything that went on. Secretaries kept minutes at all meetings of the Council, its three committees, and its governing board, that were gradually made public on the Council website, where they remain, but only in Icelandic.
When the time came to decide on the final text of the bill, votes were cast first on each individual article and at last on the bill as a whole. Each provision was approved by an overwhelming majority and the bill as a whole was adopted unanimously. 49 The votes on equal voting rights and national ownership of natural resources were followed by spontaneous applause. In line with the guiding principles of transparency, equal access, and technology the foreign involvement enriched the process, especially because the rewriting of the constitution -and of any constitution, for that matter -was always going to involve the use of other people´s ideas. Awareneess of the Council's status as global pioneer may also have played a role. Furthermore, the foreign contributions received were few compared with local ones.
Iceland has a long tradition of borrowing and adapting policy solutions from other countries, particularly the Nordic countries. Constitutional solutions studied by Council members came from a number of places, including Finland, Sweden, and Germany. 52 Councillors were inspired by academic studies as well as by foreign constitutions. 53
D. Interaction with the content of the proposal
The new Icelandic constitutional bill consists of nine chapters, containing a total of 114 articles, preceded by a preamble. Whether some parts of the bill were influenced more strongly than others by public participation in the process is hard to determine on the basis of the available data. The Facebook conversation is mostly still available. The comments and suggestions recorded on the Council website are still there, but an analysis of the correlation between the external input and the text of the bill is complicated by the fact that there are no records of the way in which the input was processed and responded to. We limited ourselves to a few suggestions regarding the preamble as well as the provisions regarding the presidency, the electoral system, open government, and natural resource management. 54 Would a preamble, a feature absent from other Nordic constitutions, have been included without public participation? Perhaps. In any case, it seems reasonable to suppose that the regular contact of Council members with citizens throughout the drafting process may have contributed to the uplifting spirit of the preamble: 'We, the people of Iceland, wish to create a just society with equal opportunities for everyone. Our different origins enrich the whole, and together we are responsible for the heritage of the generations, the land and history, nature, language and culture.' One of Iceland´s foremost living poets, Mr. Hannes Pétursson, was consulted informally on the wording of the preamble. 55 Notice the first person plural which 52 Personal communication by a Council member; even Bhutan and Bolivia were on their radar screen. 53 As illustrated by the following quote: "With each passing meeting, the CC attempted to achieve greater proximity between the written document and the sentiments of the people, whilst constantly referring also to 'state-of-the-art' constitutional practices from around the world", R Bater, 'Hope from Below: Composing the Commons in Iceland' (1 December 2011) < www.opendemocracy.net/richard-bater/hope-from-belowcomposing-commons-in-iceland> accessed 24 January 2016. presidential'. 59 The power of the president can be said to be curtailed by granting 10 per cent of the voters the right to refer legislation to a referendum, thus making the president share his veto power with the voters, and by making some details of the procedure after a presidential veto more explicit. 60 Whereas after the 2004 presidential veto of the media law it was a matter of dispute whether it was constitutional to withdraw the bill instead of putting it to a referendum, the parliament, according to the new bill, is explicitly granted authority to do so (Article 60). This slight curtailment of presidential powers can be said to be counterbalanced by giving the president a significant role in the appointment of certain public officials. This role, in conjunction with stronger justification demands, the establishment of a civil service commission, and a role for parliament in case of a presidential veto (Article 96), is seen by some as an attempt to curb the powers of ministers in this regard, and thus limit "appointment corruption". 61 (population/MP ratio of 2,800). The last such change was made in 1987 when the number of MPs was increased to its current level, 63 (population/MP ratio of 3,900). 62 Since that time, population growth has increased the population/MP ratio to 5,200, a low ratio compared with other countries. 63 The constitutional amendments of 1942, 1959, and 1987 were primarily intended to moderate the inequality of voting rights.
59
Iceland is at present divided into six electoral districts: three in the Reykjavík area, where two thirds of the population resides, and three rural districts. The votes of some rural voters weigh almost twice as heavily as do votes in the Reykjavík area, an improvement from earlier times when the ratio was first four and then three, but a ratio of nearly two is still far in excess of the extent of voter inequality tolerated in other countries, such as Norway. As intended, the electoral system has produced a disproportionate representation in parliament of the one third of the electorate living outside Reykjavík. 64 Thus, the 2013 parliamentary election granted 45 per cent of the seats in parliament to the three rural constituencies where 35 per cent of the voters reside and 55 per cent of the seats to the three urban districts where 65 per cent of the voters reside. To correct this imbalance, the bill proposes 'one person, one vote' -i.e. equal apportionment of seats in parliament -as the fundamental principle behind the electoral system. However, the proposal does not completely abandon the district system as it leaves it to parliament to determine the number of districts anywhere between one and eight.
Furthermore, the electoral provision optionally grants voters the right to vote for individuals, even across party lines, rather than for party slates as in the past. The aim here is to widen the selection of candidates available to the voters and to make divisive party primaries unnecessary. In the past, party machines or primaries have essentially doled out safe seats to candidates, leaving next to no room for the voters to influence the outcome. To achieve these ends, the Council arrived at an intricate provision, the original wording of which was found to be a bit complicated, but following their extra meeting in March 2012, councillors were able to reduce the number of words in the provision by a third while keeping its substance intact. 65 64 T Gylfason, 'From Collapse to Constitution: The Case of Iceland', in L Paganetto (ed.), Public Debt, Global Governance and Economic Dynamism (Springer 2013) . 65 Article 39 'Elections to the Althing', Constitutional Bill for a new constitution for the Republic of Iceland, revised translation of December 11, 2012: "The Althing shall be composed of sixty-three Members, nationally elected by secret ballot for a term of four years. The votes of voters everywhere in the country shall have equal weight. The country may be divided into electoral districts. They shall be eight at the most. Associations of candidates shall put forward slates, either district slates or national slates or both. Candidates may run simultaneously on a national slate and a single district slate of the same association. A voter selects individual candidates from slates in his electoral district or from nationwide slates or both. A voter is also permitted instead to mark a single district slate or a single nationwide slate, in which case the voter will be understood to have selected all the candidates on the slate equally. It is permitted to provide by law that the selection should be limited to the district slate or nationwide slate of the same association. Parliamentary seats shall be allocated to associations of candidates so that the number of Members representing each association is as close in proportion as possible to the total number of votes. The manner of allocating parliamentary seats to candidates based on their strength of vote shall be provided for by law. It is permitted to provide by law that a specified number of parliamentary seats should be tied to individual electoral districts, up to a maximum total of thirty. The number of voters on the electoral register behind each tied seat shall not be lower than the average for all sixty-three seats. The means of promoting as equal a proportion of men and women in the Althing shall be provided for in legislation on elections. Provisions of law relating to electoral district boundaries, the methods of allocating parliamentary seats and rules on candidature can be amended only by a two-thirds majority of the Althing.
Helgason explains the history and intricacies of Iceland´s electoral laws. 66 In view of Iceland´s long history of unequal voting rights, the Constitutional Council received, through its digital channels, a relatively large number of proposals focused on equal voting rights from, e.g. Alda -Association for Sustainability and Democracy. 67 The provisions on freedom of information, 68 'without evasion' (or 'without exception' as one English translation reads), 69 and on natural resources 70 ('common and perpetual property of the nation') may be linked to the participatory process, too. As was the case with electoral reform, the Council received a number of suggestions concerning those provisions. However, both provisions were in the cards from the beginning, when the contours of the revision took shape. The National Assembly had called for all three in 2010. Also, as Ólafsson has argued, the popular accountability, bestowed on the Council, may have sharpened its emphasis on electoral reform, transparency, national ownership of natural resources, and also environmental protection. 71 The fact that several provisions in the proposal were quite long and detailed, including the ones on elections, transparency, natural resources, and the environment, was perhaps not directly influenced by external input into the Council´s work. Rather, the reason for the length and detail was the perception of the Council that in some cases legislation is not enough, The proposal for Article 34 on Natural Resources reads "Iceland's natural resources which are not in private ownership are the common and perpetual property of the nation. No one may acquire the natural resources or their attached rights for ownership or permanent use, and they may never be sold or mortgaged. Resources under national ownership include resources such as harvestable fish stocks, other resources of the sea and sea bed within Icelandic jurisdiction and sources of water rights and power development rights, geothermal energy and mining rights. National ownership of resources below a certain depth from the surface of the earth may be provided for by law. The utilization of the resources shall be guided by sustainable development and the public interest. Government authorities, together with those who utilize the resources, are responsible for their protection. On the basis of law, government authorities my grant permits for the use or utilization of resources or other limited public goods against full consideration and for a reasonable period of time. Such permits shall be granted on a non-discriminatory basis and shall never entail ownership or irrevocable control of the resources. for example, by an official at Europol in Rotterdam. He wrote the Constitutional Council to argue that Icelandic legislation concerning the confiscation of stolen property lags behind that of many other European nations and suggested that the Council include a provision on such confiscation in its bill. This advice was discussed, but not heeded; however, it provides an illustration of the type of reasoning that led to rather lengthy provisions in some cases.
Another example is that parliament's slow legislative action to equalize voting rights prompted the inclusion of detailed electoral rules in the constitutional bill.
E. Link with the outcome?
Based on data from developing countries in transition, Moehler suggests that rather than direct participation, it is the involvement of local leaders that leads citizens to support a new constitution. 72 According to Klein and Sajó, 'even that the Council was 'completely illegitimate', adding that 'a certain elite' (presumably including himself) should rewrite the constitution. 74 However, as the overview of the use of digital tools above demonstrates, no one could justifiably complain that he or she did not have access to the process.
IV.
Conclusion: Bittersweet lessons from a unique experiment
One of us has argued elsewhere that the impromptu character of the procedure and a lack of constraints on the sources of 'constitutional input', compounded by a few of the more radical provisions proposed, were the cause of the constitutional bill's derailment in parliament. 75 Others have argued that concessions to parliament through a less ambitious bill -say, one without equal voting rights and without public ownership of natural resourceswould not have reflected the conclusion of the National Assembly. The reasoning is that such a bill would not have been passed unanimously in the Council if at all, and would not have won approval in the national referendum. 76 Under normal circumstances, perhaps, concessions to the parliament and to special interests along these lines might have been advisable and justifiable, but less than three years after Iceland's spectacular financial crash, 77 with parliament´s reputation in shatters, such concessions found little support. Even at the time of writing, nearly seven years after the crash, parliament enjoys the trust of 14 to 18 per cent of Icelandic respondents in public opinion polls, which is barely more than the banks. 78 This chapter has revolved around the use of digital online tools to aid the drafting and its meaning for the identification "We the people". What lessons can be drawn, specifically in relation to the knowledge of today regarding the outcome?
Delivering its bill to parliament, the Council wrote in its cover letter that " [t] he idea that the public had their say in the revision of the constitution has […] been preserved" 79 
